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Abstract 
Despite the fact that there is increasing integration of Buddhist principles and practices into 
Western mental health and applied psychological disciplines, there appears to be limited 
understanding in Western psychology of the assumptions that underlie a Buddhist model of 
mental illness. The concept of ontological addiction was introduced and formulated in order 
to narrow some of the disconnect between Buddhist and Western models of mental illness, 
and to foster effective assimilation of Buddhist practices and principles into mental health 
research and practice. Ontological addiction refers to the maladaptive condition whereby an 
individual is addicted to the belief that they inherently exist. The purposes of the present 
paper are to: (i) classify ontological addiction in terms of its definition, symptoms, 
prevalence, and functional consequences, (ii) examine the etiology of the condition, and (iii) 
appraise both the traditional Buddhist and contemporary empirical literature in order to 
outline effective treatment strategies. An assessment of the extent to which ontological 
addiction meets the clinical criteria for addiction suggests that ontological addiction is a 
chronic and valid – albeit functionally distinct (i.e., when compared to chemical and 
behavioral addictions) – form of addiction. However, despite the protracted and pervasive 
nature of the condition, recent empirical findings add support to ancient Buddhist teachings 
and suggest that addiction to selfhood can be overcome by a treatment process involving 
phases of: (i) becoming aware of the imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the imputed self, and 
(iii) reconstructing a dynamic and non-dual self.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The biopsychosocial model of mental illness asserts that biological, psychological, and social 
factors each play a role in the onset of mental illness (Engel, 1978). It was formulated as an 
alternative to the medical model, which from the late 1970s onwards, was increasingly 
regarded by the scientific community as a form of biomedical reductionism (Ghaemi, 2009).  
However, despite the more inclusive approach of the biopsychosocial model, it is not 
necessarily compatible with emerging thought and empirical findings regarding the etiology 
and treatment of psychopathology. More specifically, there is growing assimilation in the 
clinical literature of ancient Buddhist principles concerning the determinants of mental 
illness, as well as interventional techniques constructed upon these principles (Kelly, 2015). 
Consequently, a somewhat paradoxical trend appears to be emerging where mental illnesses 
that are increasingly conceptualized and diagnosed according to a Western biopsychosocial 
framework, are being treated (or recommended for treatment) utilizing Buddhist-derived 
interventions that reject the assumption that mental illness can be solely attributed to a 
combination of biological, psychological, and social influences.  
Consistent with the principles of evidence-based medicine and a ‘what works’ approach 
to treating mental illness, it could be argued that utilizing interventions constructed upon 
assumptions that are incongruous with a Western understanding of psychopathology does not 
present a problem in and of itself. However, although this is true up to a point, a problem 
begins to emerge when: (i) many researchers and clinicians are seemingly unaware that the 
assumptions underlying the techniques they are researching and/or administering run 
tangential to mainstream Western scientific and medical opinion concerning the determinants 
of psychopathology, and (ii) there is limited understanding in the clinical and scientific 
literature of the mechanisms posited by 2500-year-old Buddhist meditational theory that 
underlie therapeutic change (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2014a). 
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In an attempt to foster effective assimilation of Buddhist practices and principles into 
mental health research and practice, and in an attempt to narrow some of the disconnect 
between Buddhist and Western models of mental illness, the concept of ontological addiction 
was recently introduced and formulated by Shonin, Van Gordon, and Griffiths (2013). 
Consistent with traditional Buddhist thought concerning the origins and nature of 
psychopathology (and suffering more generally), ontological addiction refers to the 
maladaptive condition whereby an individual is addicted to the belief that they inherently 
exist (i.e., as an independent and autonomous entity). The purpose of the present paper is to 
build upon earlier theoretical and empirical works by undertaking an in-depth assessment of 
the various attributes of ontological addiction. By so doing, the present authors hope to 
elucidate a Buddhist construction of mental illness that is more palatable to a Western 
medical and scientific audience. The paper begins by classifying ontological addiction in 
terms of its definition, symptoms, prevalence, and functional consequences, and continues by 
examining the etiology of the condition. The final part of the paper appraises both the 
traditional Buddhist and current empirical literature in order to propose effective treatment 
strategies. 
 
Classification 
Definition 
Ontological addiction has been defined as “the unwillingness to relinquish an erroneous and 
deep-rooted belief in an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as the impaired functionality 
that arises from such a belief” (Shonin et al., 2013, p.64). The intended meaning of each of 
the key terms employed in this definition is explicated below in more detail. 
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Deep-rooted belief 
The words deep-rooted belief are intended to emphasize the persistent and consuming nature 
of the belief in an inherently existing self. In many respects, this term is similar to the notion 
of core beliefs in cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). Core beliefs are deep-seated beliefs 
that often go unrecognized but significantly influence the way individuals interpret and react 
with people and the world around them (Wells, 1997). However, over and above their 
meaning within CBT contexts, the words deep-rooted belief are employed in the definition of 
ontological addiction in order to depict a much more persistent and primitive form of core 
belief. According to Buddhist theory, in the period following death the innermost aspect of a 
person’s mind or consciousness is reborn within another physical (or non-physical) form 
(Sogyal, 1998).1 Buddhism asserts2 that the particular rebirth an individual is attracted to is 
governed by whichever cognitive and behavioral response patterns become dominant during 
their lifetime (and during previous lifetimes). The Buddhist teachings explain that embedded 
patterns of thinking and behavior leave an ‘imprint’ on the mind-stream and that following 
death, these tend to propel the innermost aspect of consciousness towards (or away from) a 
particular rebirth (Sogyal, 1998). A detailed explication of Buddhist transmigration theory is 
beyond the scope of this paper but the salient point is that according to Buddhist philosophy, 
                                                          
1 It could be construed that there is a contradiction between the statement that there is an innermost aspect of 
consciousness that survives death, and the assertion in the subsequent section that sentient beings are of the 
nature of ‘non-self’. However, these assertions are compatible because the innermost aspect of consciousness is 
also of the nature of non-self (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2014a).  
2 Some scholars assert that there are many ‘Buddhisms’. In terms of the external form that Buddhism takes 
within a particular culture, time, and geographic region, this assertion is acceptable. However, all authentic 
Buddhist lineages teach methods that ultimately lead to the same result. Furthermore, most of these methods are 
intended to foster insight into core Buddhist principles such as suffering, impermanence, and non-self. Suffering 
is suffering whether you approach it from a Theravada, Mahayana, or Vajrayana perspective (see Shonin et al. 
[2014a] for an overview of major Buddhist schools, and the differences between them). The same applies to 
impermanence and non-self. Thus, the different Buddhist ‘vehicles’ (a translation of the Sanskrit word yana) 
and their respective traditions all work with the same principles, which they reconstitute and teach in different 
ways. The most profound Vajrayana practices are implicit within the simplest of Buddhist teachings, such as the 
discourse on the four noble truths (Van Gordon, Shonin, Griffiths, & Singh, 2015b). Therefore, within 
Buddhism, there are different interpretations of how to effectively practice spiritual development, but in essence, 
they represent variations on the same theme. 
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beings are born with a latent tendency to clutch at a ‘self’ and to believe that they inherently 
exist (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997). 
 
Inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ 
Models of ‘the self’ in Western psychology range from those that posit a ‘concrete self’, to 
those that assume a more fluid self-schema. An example of the former would be Rogers’ 
(1959) humanistic formation in which dimensions of self-worth, self-image, and ideal-self are 
collectively understood to comprise an individual’s self-concept. Examples of the latter 
would be certain social psychological constructions in which a more relational self is 
proposed (Smith & Mackie, 2007), and Jungian theory (1981) where it is asserted that the self 
cannot be confined to a given location in time or space. While some postmodern and 
poststructuralist philosophical and psychological perspectives have begun to question the 
validity of the self-concept (e.g., Gergen, 2009), it remains the case that most established 
models of self in Western psychology are locus-orientated, and thus implicitly or explicitly 
accept that there is a ‘self’ or an ‘I’ that intrinsically exists (Chan, 2008; Shonin, Van 
Gordon, Singh, & Griffiths, 2015a).  
Despite the tendency of most people to derive reassurance from the belief that they exist 
as a definite ‘I’ entity, the existence of such an entity is logically and scientifically 
implausible. Without exception, phenomena – including human beings – do not manifest as 
discrete standalone entities but manifest only in reliance upon numerous (or innumerable) 
causes and conditions (Dalai Lama, 2001). For example, the human body relies for its 
existence on the air that it breathes, animals and plants that it eats, rain that it drinks, and so 
forth. If a single one of these conditions is not present, the human body ceases to manifest 
(Nhat Hanh, 1992). The fact that phenomena are fundamentally interconnected (i.e., 
boundless) means that they are of the nature of ‘non-self’. Phenomena do not possess a self 
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that exists independently. However, for the same reasons that it can asserted that animate and 
inanimate objects are empty of an intrinsically existing self, it can also be asserted that they 
are ‘full’ of everything that exists. Therefore, the one implies the whole, and the whole 
implies the one. Consequently, the notion of an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ is referred to 
as erroneous in the above definition of ontological addiction because a self that exists 
independently and of its own accord is untenable (for a detailed explication of the notions of 
‘non-self’ and ‘emptiness’, see Shonin et al., [2015a]). 
 
Unwillingness to relinquish and impaired functionality 
The terms unwillingness to relinquish and impaired functionality refer to the ‘addictive’ 
properties of ontological addiction, and the fact that it is a maladaptive condition. According 
to Griffiths’ (2005) component model of addiction, for a condition to be considered as an 
addiction, the following six components must be present: (i) salience, (ii) mood modification, 
(iii) tolerance, (iv) withdrawal, (v) conflict, and (iv) relapse. The following draws upon both 
the traditional Buddhist and contemporary psychological (theoretical and empirical) literature 
in order to examine the extent to which ontological addiction meets the conventional criterial 
for classification as an addiction:  
 
1. Salience occurs when the activity becomes the single most important undertaking in 
the person’s life and dominates their thinking, feelings, and behavior (Griffiths, 
2005). Conventional chemical and behavioral forms of addiction involve the ingestion 
of a psychoactive substance (e.g., alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, etc.) and/or engagement 
in an activity (e.g., gambling, internet use, sex). The substance or activity in question 
becomes a (or the) focal point in the individual’s life, and they invariably have some 
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awareness of their involvement with the activity or substance in question (Griffiths, 
2005).  
A key difference between ontological addiction and conventional forms of 
addiction is that in the case of the former, the individual is not necessarily aware that 
they are in some way ‘involved’ with the object of their addiction (i.e., they are not 
consciously engaged in the act of believing that they inherently exist). However, this 
does not detract from the fact that their belief in a discrete ‘I’ entity dominates their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. According to Buddhist psychology, attachment or 
addiction to self governs each and every choice made by an individual afflicted with 
ontological addiction (Chan, 2008). In other words, the belief in an inherently existing 
self is understood to become so important to the individual that they are unable to 
associate with it as being separate from themselves (i.e., it has become a characteristic 
that defines their being rather than an activity that they routinely engage in). Thus, the 
criterion of salience is certainly met by ontological addiction, but it takes on a slightly 
different aspect compared to the meaning of this term in conventional addiction 
contexts. 
2. Mood modification refers to the subjective experiences that people report as a 
consequence of engaging in the addictive activity, and can be seen as a coping 
strategy (i.e., experiencing an arousing ‘buzz’ or a ‘high’ or paradoxically, a 
tranquilizing feeling of ‘escape’ or ‘numbing’) (Griffiths, 2005). According to 
Buddhist psychology and what is known as the chain of dependent origination 
(Nanamoli & Bodhi, 2009), the underlying cause of all feelings (positive or negative) 
is ignorance as to the manner in which the self exists. Because most individuals have 
a deep rooted belief in an intrinsically existing ‘self’, they crave objects, situations, 
and experiences that they deem will advance the interests of the self. Acquiring such 
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objects, situations, or experiences brings temporary happiness, such as feelings of 
comfort, relief, elation, pleasure, joy, or pride. However, the process of desiring and 
acquiring ‘favorable’ circumstances reifies the individual’s belief in a self, and an 
addiction feedback loop arises (see section on Etiology for a fuller description of 
addiction feedback loops in the context of the ontological addiction condition). 
The strategy of the individual suffering from ontological addiction is flawed 
because demand (i.e., desire) for favorable conditions always outweighs supply. 
Indeed, when an individual acquires a certain level of psychological and/or material 
comfort, Buddhism asserts that their expectations raise accordingly (Shonin et al., 
2014a). Therefore, ontological addiction gives rise to ‘trait’ experiences of mood 
modification (e.g., elation, satisfaction) that arise out of a ‘state’ experience of 
suffering which is born from constantly craving such trait experiences.    
3. Tolerance is the process whereby increasing amounts of the activity are required to 
achieve the former mood modifying effects (Griffiths, 2005). Compared to the other 
components of Griffiths’ model of addiction, the rationale for including tolerance as a 
feature of ontological addiction requires greater explanation. From the Buddhist 
perspective and as discussed above, people are born with a propensity to become 
addicted to themselves. Depending upon which cognitive-behavioral response 
patterns become dominant during their life, Buddhism asserts that they either augment 
or weaken their belief in selfhood (Gampopa, 1998). However, during this current 
time period, it is understood (within Buddhism) that most individuals are inclined 
towards compounding their belief in selfhood. In Buddhist terms, this is the same as 
asserting that although most individuals are aware of a spiritual aspect to their being, 
they invariably choose not to nourish or develop it.  
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One explanation for the tendency of people to repel themselves from authentic 
spiritual practice (which does not necessarily equate to religious practice) is that they 
do not wish to confront and/or make efforts towards dismantling the ‘selfhood’ that 
they have worked so hard to construct (Trungpa, 2002). Consequently, according to 
this line of Buddhist thought, individuals effectively ‘run’ from themselves and 
require ever increasing levels of immersion in emotions, discursive thinking patterns, 
and worldly pursuits in order to sustain and further augment the deluded belief that 
they inherently exist. From this perspective, it can be argued that tolerance is a 
component feature of ontological addiction. 
4. Withdrawal symptoms are the unpleasant feeling states and/or physical effects (e.g., 
moodiness, irritability, etc.) that occur when the person is unable to engage in the 
addictive activity (Griffiths, 2005). As noted above, in the current era (known in 
Buddhism as pashchimadharma [Sanskrit] or mappō [Japanese]), people might go 
through the motions of engaging in spiritual practice, but according to Buddhist 
theory, the majority of people are repelled by the idea of wholeheartedly committing 
themselves to spiritual development (Marra, 1988). Consequently, Buddhism asserts 
that individuals invariably repel – sometimes with extreme anger or venom – attempts 
to ease them off their addiction to a ‘me’, a ‘mine’, and an ‘I’. One well-known 
historic example of this might be the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Through the use of 
selfless acts of kindness and what were deemed to be miracles, Christ is reported to 
have provided people with undeniable ‘evidence’ that the ‘Kingdom of God’ was a 
place or state they could access after transcending selfish thoughts and behaviors. 
However, having been shown, beyond reasonable doubt, that it was possible (i.e., via 
engaging in authentic spiritual practice) to completely transcend selfishness and thus 
experience ‘God’, historical records (e.g., the Gospel according to St. Luke, Chapter 
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23) report that the ‘people’ became angry and killed (i.e., crucified) Christ. Thus, if 
Buddhism is correct in asserting that individuals are generally repelled by the idea of 
transcending selfhood, then it can be argued that withdrawal symptoms are a 
component of ontological addiction. 
5. Conflict refers to the conflicts between the person and those around them 
(interpersonal conflict), conflicts with other activities (e.g., work, social life, hobbies, 
and interests) or from within the individual (e.g., intra-psychic conflict and/or 
subjective feelings of loss of control) that are concerned with spending too much time 
engaging in the addictive activity (Griffiths, 2005). As highlighted in more detail 
below (see Etiology section), Buddhism attributes all forms of intrapersonal and intra-
psychic conflict to an individual’s belief in, and addiction to, selfhood (Gampopa, 
1998). Even attempts to avoid intra-psychic conflict by engaging in experiential 
avoidance (defined by Hayes et al. [2006] as unwillingness to remain in contact with 
particular private experiences) would be considered in Buddhism to be an expression 
of ontological addiction because if the individual was not afflicted by a belief in 
selfhood, they would not be inclined to reject experiences or sensations that they 
deem are constituents of the ‘self’. 
Recent empirical findings support the Buddhist position regarding the underlying 
source of conflict and indicate that non-attachment to self and experience plays an 
important role in the regulation of maladaptive and distressing psychological states. 
Based on participant responses to the (Buddhist-compatible) Non-Attachment Scale 
(Sahdra, Shaver, & Brown, 2010), non-attachment to self and experience has been 
shown to predict: (i) greater levels of acceptance, non-reactivity, mindfulness, self-
compassion, subjective wellbeing, pro-social behavior, and eudemonic wellbeing, and 
(ii) lower levels of fatalistic outlook, intimacy avoidance, dissociation, and 
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alexithymia (i.e., an impaired capacity to identify or describe feelings) (Sahdra et al., 
2010; Sahdra, Ciarrochi, Parker, Marshall, & Heaven, 2015). Based on these 
empirical findings and the Buddhist construction of suffering more generally, it 
appears that conflict is a core feature of ontological addiction. 
6. Relapse is the tendency for repeated reversions to earlier patterns of excessive 
engagement in the activity to recur, and for even the most extreme patterns typical of 
the height of excessive engagement in the addictive activity to be quickly restored 
after periods of control (Griffiths, 2005). According to some Buddhist teachers, it is 
not uncommon for individuals to undertake spiritual practice and begin making 
inroads into weakening their addiction to self but to subsequently lose enthusiasm and 
allow ego-driven cognitive-behavioral processes to re-establish themselves (Shonin & 
Van Gordon, 2015a). From this point of view, it appears that relapse is a component 
feature of ontological addiction. 
 
Symptoms 
If it is accepted that a ‘psychopathology’ reflects an aberration from a statistical norm of 
suffering or functionality, then it is questionable whether ontological addiction can be defined 
as such. However, if the term ‘psychopathology’ is understood to mean a condition that 
severely and chronically impairs functionality, then ontological addiction can be considered 
an ‘illness’. Either way, the merits of developing and validating a diagnostic test for 
ontological addiction need to be carefully considered because if the assumptions elucidated 
throughout this paper are correct, then it can be expected that a substantial proportion of the 
world’s population would satisfy the diagnostic criteria. This is not to say that a clinical cut-
off and severity ratings could not be established because, consistent with Buddhist thought, it 
is reasonable to assume that there would be variation amongst individuals in the intensity of 
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their belief in an inherently existing self. Nevertheless, the primary purpose for elucidating 
below the primary symptoms of ontological addiction – that have been sourced from a 
synthesis of the canonical Buddhist literature – is to help foster understanding of the Buddhist 
model of mental illness rather than provide a definitive set of diagnostic criteria per se: 
 
1. Presence of a DSM-5 mental disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, personality disorders, 
trauma and stressor-related disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, dissociative 
disorders, etc.) excluding neurodevelopmental disorders and other disorders that are 
principally biological in nature (e.g., neurocognitive disorders, specific sexual 
dysfunctions, etc.). 
2. Blindly focused on advancing wealth, material possessions, or status (including at the 
expense of others’ wellbeing). 
3. General disregard for the fact that death is a certainty and that its’ timing is uncertain 
(i.e., a lack of death awareness). 
4. Embroiled in schemes, plans, and/or quarrels with limited capacity to step back and 
approach such activities with clarity and perspective. 
5. Easily offended and responds with anger/irritation on occasions when the ego or 
selfhood is challenged or questioned. 
6. Gloats and responds with pride when praised or on occasions when the ego or 
selfhood is reinforced. 
7. Dislike or hatred of individuals and scenarios that are deemed to threaten the interests 
of the self. 
8. Strong attachment towards individuals and scenarios that are deemed to advance the 
interests of the self. 
9. Superiority or inferiority complex. 
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10. Limited interest in matters of a spiritual nature or in undertaking spiritual practice. 
11. Blind belief in a set of religious dogma including the belief in a ruling or divine entity 
that is in some way responsible for life occurrences. 
12. Belief that there intrinsically exists a: (i) self or other, (ii) this or that, (iii) here or 
there, (iv) past, (v) future, or (vi) present moment3. 
 
Prevalence 
Given the very recent formulation of the ontological addiction concept, no studies have been 
published that specifically estimate the prevalence of the condition. However, there exist 
prevalence estimates for some of the abovementioned symptoms of ontological addiction and 
thus, it is possible to indirectly approximate a minimum level of global prevalence for the 
condition. Notable examples are: (i) global prevalence estimates for the existence of mental 
illness (symptom 1 above) which are in the range of 20-33% (National Institute of Mental 
Health, 2012; WHO International Consortium in Psychiatric Epidemiology, 2000), and (ii) 
prevalence estimates for a belief in God (symptom 11 above) which for the US, are in the 
order of 78-92% of the population (Gallup, 2013; Maugans & Wadland, 1991; Harris Poll, 
2009).  
Clearly, the reliability of such figures is questionable because (for example) there are 
criteria whereby a belief in an external God would not necessarily equate to the occurrence of 
ontological addiction. For instance, the word ‘God’ means different things to different people 
and whilst, from the Buddhist perspective, a belief in a divine and/or ruling being requires 
that there is a ‘self’ that likewise believes it exists, the belief that ‘God’ corresponds more to 
                                                          
3 From the Buddhist perspective, being ‘without intrinsic existence’ is a property that applies to all things, 
including the present moment. In other words, ‘non-self’ and ‘emptiness’ (which in essence are the same thing) 
are not selective. Briefly, because time never stands still, logic dictates that there is never a point when a present 
moment crystallizes into existence. For a fuller explication of why the present moment doesn’t intrinsically 
exist, see Shonin & Van Gordon (2014b).  
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a principle, pervasive and unifying energy, or state that awaits those that can transcend 
selfhood reflects a much less dualistic (i.e., self-other) interpretation. Nevertheless, given the 
broad range of symptoms that relate to ontological addiction – of which some (e.g., anger, 
hatred, pride, desire for wealth, etc.) might be deemed to be core traits of human behavior – 
global prevalence rates for at least a mild-to-moderate level of ontological addiction could be 
expected to exceed 99%. 
 
Development and Course 
As discussed above, ontological addiction is considered to be latent at birth. However, 
symptoms first begin to manifest as an individual develops a sense of selfhood during 
childhood. Consequently, and in practice, there is a progressive onset with symptoms first 
manifesting during childhood and gradually progressing into adulthood. For most individuals, 
the course is persistent and stable, unless treatment is initiated (Tsong-kha-pa, 2004). 
  
Risk and Prognostic Factors 
Risk and prognostic factors for ontological addiction are principally environmental (i.e., 
rather than genetic or physiological). A lack of exposure to, or uptake of, spiritual values and 
principles is likely to increase severity and/or result in earlier onset. Exposure to conditions 
that foster desire for wealth, pleasure, and reputation can likewise increase severity 
(Gampopa, 1998).  
 
Functional Consequences 
The unyielding belief in a ‘me’, ‘mine’, and ‘I’ results in interpersonal and inter-psychic 
conflict as discussed above. However, perhaps more importantly, ontological addiction 
effectively causes the mind to limit and ‘turn in’ on itself. Due to being absorbed in selfhood, 
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perspective and clarity of thought diminishes and the belief in inherent existence acts a filter 
that impedes the ability to directly perceive and remain aware of the present moment (Norbu 
& Clemente, 1997). Self-addiction drives cyclic existence (i.e., the unending cycle of birth, 
death, and rebirth) and fosters ignorance as to the ultimate and deeply interconnected nature 
of phenomena (Dalai Lama, 2001). 
 
Etiology 
Earlier in the paper, reference was made to the lack of compatibility between the Buddhist 
and biopsychosocial models of mental illness. Buddhism does not deny that biological, 
psychological, and social factors play a role in the onset of mental illness, but it considers 
them to be secondary determinants. From the Buddhist perspective, a primary limitation of 
the biopsychosocial model is that it places minimal emphasis on the role of spiritual factors. 
This conceptualization also appears to be carried over to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), where 
discussion specifically relating to problems that are spiritual or religious in nature is limited 
to a total of four lines of text. 
In the DSM-5, religious or spiritual problems are categorized as Problems Related to 
Other Psychosocial, Personal, and Environmental Circumstances within the section on Other 
Conditions that May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention. In respect of religious or spiritual 
problems (DSM-5 code V62.89), the DSM-5 gives examples of: (i) distressing experiences 
that involve loss or questioning of faith, (ii) problems associated with conversion to a new 
faith, and (iii) questioning of spiritual values that may not necessarily be related to an 
organized church or religious institution (American Psychological Association, 2013). Thus, 
the DSM-5 considers problems that are spiritual or religious in nature to be features that can 
accompany, but are distinct from, mental illness (Yang & Lukoff, 2006). Rejecting the 
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possibility of spiritual issues manifesting as mental illness arguably reduces the clinical 
significance of such issues. This is consistent with what the present authors would argue is a 
relative lack of emphasis placed by clinical psychology on the role that spiritual factors play 
in the etiology of diagnosable mental illnesses.  
In comparison, Buddhism adopts a different perspective and asserts that spiritual 
factors: (i) are the foremost determinants of mental illness, and (ii) can be variants of mental 
illness in and of themselves (e.g., ontological addiction) (Shonin et al., 2013). From the 
Buddhist perspective, the term ‘spiritual’ could be interpreted as meaning ‘that which helps to 
transcend selfhood’. Consequently, character traits such as generosity, patience, compassion, 
loving kindness, and death awareness are highly regarded in Buddhism because to differing 
extents, their cultivation requires the individual to be ‘other’ centered as opposed to ‘self’ 
centered (Khyentse, 2007). Consistent with this mode of thought, actions and behaviors that 
are self-centered are generally looked upon unfavorably in Buddhism because they are 
understood to reify an individual’s belief in inherent existence (Dalai Lama, 2001). 
Transcending selfhood in the context of it being a spiritual pursuit should not be confused 
with losing one’s self-identity as part of a group. From the Buddhist perspective, individuals 
generally join groups or causes because the ego-self wants to belong to, or believe in, 
something (Shonin et al., 2014a). In other words, for most people, joining causes and groups 
actually reifies their sense of a ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘I’ (e.g. ‘I belong to this’, ‘I believe in that’, 
‘my view’, ‘my rights’, etc.). 
Due to being ignorant of their absolute nature and as previously discussed, Buddhism 
explicates that individuals are attracted to circumstances that they deem will promote their 
selfhood and interests (Chah, 2011). This process is known as attachment and is defined as 
“the over-allocation of cognitive and emotional resources towards a particular object, 
construct, or idea to the extent that the object is assigned an attractive quality that is 
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unrealistic and that exceeds its intrinsic worth” (Shonin et al., 2014a, p. 126). Buddhism 
teaches that because sentient beings believe that they inherently exist, they view the world in 
dualistic terms and allocate unrealistic levels of value to (what they deem to be) desirable 
external objects and situations. 
However, because the ‘self’ is an imputed (i.e., made up) construct, Buddhism asserts 
that no amount of exposure to desirable objects and circumstances will result in lasting 
happiness (Gampopa, 1999). In other words, having finally gained possession of the 
commodity, person, or position that was previously the object of desire, Buddhism teaches 
that dissatisfaction will once again manifest in the mind, and that new commodities and 
situations will avail themselves as the object of the self’s attachment (Chah, 2011). 
Furthermore, because sentient beings and the conditions in which they find themselves are 
constantly changing (i.e., they are impermanent), favorable circumstances can, at best, be 
enjoyed for only a limited period of time. Therefore, a component attribute of ontological 
addiction is the incessant desire to have something else, be somebody else, and/or be 
somewhere else. 
Thus, Buddhism asserts that desirous and self-centered thoughts and behaviors are both 
product and cause of ontological addiction (Shonin et al., 2014a). The belief in an inherently 
existing self is understood to augment each time an individual views the world in self-other 
(i.e., dualistic) terms, and this augmented belief, in turn, increases the intensity and frequency 
of self-centered thoughts and behaviors. In many respects, this process is similar to current 
clinical understanding regarding the acquisition of addictive behavior and the development of 
addiction feedback loops. According to conventional addiction theory, particular behaviors 
induce positive or negative affective states, as well as memories that correspond to the mood-
modification associated with these behaviors (Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 
2004). Stimuli subsequently trigger these memories that result in cravings to either re-
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experience (i.e., if it was positive), or avoid (i.e., if it was negative), the affective response. 
The cravings prompt behaviors that are subsequently rewarded or punished by the resulting 
modification of mood, thus encoding additional associative memories and fueling an 
addiction feedback loop (Houlihan & Brewer, 2015).  
According to the Buddhist model, the process of acting selfishly and thus amplifying 
the belief in selfhood results in a negative feedback loop (Dalai Lama, 2001). As referred to 
previously, the intensification of selfish beliefs and behavioral patterns is understood in 
Buddhism to culminate in spiritual undernourishment. Without the protective influence of 
suitably developed spiritual competencies (e.g., compassion, loving-kindness, generosity, 
metacognitive insight, etc.), high levels of self-absorption eventually render individuals 
susceptible to mental illness including (but not limited to) episodes of anxiety, depression, 
trauma, and psychosis (Shonin et al., 2013). In summary, from the Buddhist perspective, 
suffering (including ontological addiction and derivative forms of mental illness) is the 
consequence of the mind: (i) viewing and interacting with the world through the lens of 
selfhood, and (ii) attempting to force reality to function in a manner that is scientifically and 
logically implausible.  
 
Treatment 
Assessment of an individual’s suitability to receive treatment, and determining the duration 
and specific content of individual treatment phases, should be undertaken by a highly 
experienced meditator who, consistent which Buddhist guidelines, has cultivated a serene and 
disciplined mind (Van Gordon, Shonin, Griffiths, & Singh, 2015a; a detailed appraisal of the 
qualities of a suitable ‘ontological addiction therapist’ is beyond the scope of this paper). 
However, for the purposes of outlining a generic course of treatment for ontological 
addiction, the following phases of treatment are recommended: (i) becoming aware of the 
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imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the imputed self, and (iii) reconstructing a dynamic and non-
dual self.  
 
Phase One: Becoming Aware of the Imputed Self 
The treatment of ontological addiction is concerned with uprooting an individual’s deep-
rooted belief that they inherently exist. However, before the process of deconstructing the self 
can begin in earnest, it is first necessary for the individual to become aware of: (i) the fact 
that they have constructed a self, and (ii) the various attributes of the imputed self. 
Consequently, the first phase of treatment focuses on enhancing self-awareness and on 
helping individuals come to terms with the fact that there are actually no credible grounds 
upon which it can be said that they intrinsically exist as a discrete ‘I’ entity. For most 
individuals and consistent with qualitative research findings, the implausibility of selfhood is 
likely to be a difficult notion to digest (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b; Van Gordon, Shonin, 
& Griffiths, 2015b). Therefore, an element of psycho-education – focusing on the logic and 
principles of non-self and emptiness – is normally administered at the onset of treatment. 
Another principal aspect of the first treatment phase is gaining proficiency in 
meditative awareness. Meditative techniques introduced during this phase of treatment tend 
to be more concentration-based (i.e., as opposed to insight-based). Concentrative meditation 
(Pāli: samatha) is understood to facilitate an individual’s development of self-awareness, 
including awareness of the movements of both body and mind (Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997; 
Singh et al., 2013). Mindfulness plays an important role here and serves the purpose of 
regulating concentration and ensuring that it remains meditative in aspect (Van Gordon et al., 
2015a). A primary goal of the first phase of treatment is for the individual to develop the 
ability to sustain a degree of meditative awareness outside of formal seated meditation 
sessions (i.e., as they go about their daily activates). A detailed explication of the principles 
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of concentrative meditation and mindfulness is beyond the scope of this paper but some 
important considerations are as follows: 
 
1. The focus should be on introducing meditative awareness into daily life, and seated 
meditation sessions of excessive duration should be discouraged. 
2. The individual’s breathing can be used as an attentional referent (i.e., to anchor 
concentration in the present moment) (Singh et al., 2007). 
3. Whilst maintaining awareness of breathing, meditative attention should be directed, in 
successive order, towards the body, feelings, and mental processes (e.g., thoughts, 
perceptions, self-centered beliefs and cognitive-behavioral responses, attachments, 
etc.). 
4. The primary objective is to observe phenomena (e.g., sights, sounds, feelings, 
thoughts, etc.) as they enter the attentional sphere. Phenomena should be permitted to 
endure as objects of awareness until such time as they naturally exit the attentional 
sphere. 
5. Over exertion (including forced breathing) should be discouraged. 
6. The overall objective of concentrative meditation is to introduce tranquility into the 
body, and ‘breathing space’ into the mind. Feelings of meditative tranquility should 
be encouraged but dependency on them should be discouraged. If meditative 
tranquility arises, it should be treated as an observable phenomenon and – as with all 
other psychosomatic experiences – adopted as an object of meditative awareness. 
 
 Although the primary purpose for utilizing concentrative meditation is to induce 
psychological and somatic calming, findings from fMRI studies suggest that the process of 
simply observing and placing concentration upon observable sensory, psychological, and 
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environmental phenomena begins to undermine the intensity of self-addiction. More 
specifically, activation of the default mode network (DMN) is correlated with the state of 
‘mind wandering’ (i.e., discursive thinking) and self-referential processing (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Mindfulness practice 
has been shown to reduce activation of the DMN, including in the posterior cingulate cortex 
(a primary DMN node) (Houlihan & Brewer, 2015). Given that posterior cingulate cortex 
activation is positively correlated with severity of nicotine- and alcohol-related addictive 
cravings (Claus, Ewing, Filbey, Sabbineni, & Hutchison, 2011), there is tentative evidence 
suggesting that concentrative meditation may help to regulate the activation of brain areas 
associated with self-addiction and derivative self-referential processes (Houlihan & Brewer, 
2015).  
 
Phase Two: Deconstructing the Imputed Self 
Phase One of the treatment process helps to foster familiarity with the various attributes of 
the imputed self and to create the appropriate conditions for uprooting maladaptive ego-
centered core beliefs. This procedure of uprooting or ‘deconstructing’ the imputed self is the 
focus of Phase Two, and it unfolds via the use of both indirect and direct psycho-spiritual 
techniques. 
 
Indirect techniques 
During Phase Two of the treatment, the individual is taught to cultivate and practice a range 
of spiritual competencies including compassion, generosity, patience, loving-kindness, and 
death awareness. The intention behind training in such aptitudes is to indirectly undermine 
ego-centricity, and thus complement the action of meditative techniques that are intended to 
directly target addiction to selfhood (see Direct techniques sub-section below). 
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These spiritual aptitudes, that can be easily practised outside of formal seated 
meditation, have in recent years been subject to differing degrees of empirical enquiry, and 
are each understood to play an important role in fostering psychological wellbeing and/or 
treating psychopathology. For example, compassion and loving kindness-meditation have 
been shown to increase activity in brain areas associated with the regulation of neural 
emotional circuitry (e.g., anterior insula, post-central gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, 
amygdala, and right temporal-parietal junction) (Keysers, 2011; Lutz, Brefczynski-Lewis, 
Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008). Increased regulation of neural emotional circuitry helps to 
modulate descending brain-to-spinal cord noxious neural inputs (Melzack, 1991), and may 
explain why some individuals experience reductions in pain intensity and pain tolerance 
during and following engagement in compassion and loving-kindness meditation (Shonin, 
Van Gordon, Compare, Zangeneh, & Griffiths, 2015b). Loving-kindness and compassion 
meditation have also been shown to increase implicit and explicit affection towards known 
and unknown others, and to thus improve social-connectedness and prosocial behavior 
(Hutcherson, Seppala, & Gross; 2008; Leiberg, Olga, & Tania, 2011). In turn, greater social-
connectedness exerts a protective influence over life-stressors as well as feelings of 
loneliness, isolation, and low sense of purpose (Shonin et al., 2015b).  
 
Direct techniques 
Breath awareness and the meditative tranquility referred to in the above explication of Phase 
One of the treatment has been shown to slow down autonomic and psychological arousal 
(Van Gordon, Shonin, & Griffiths, 2015c). This, in turn, allows thoughts, feelings and 
sensory processes to be recognized and meditatively investigated on an individual basis. This 
meditative investigation of phenomena is a key component of Phase Two of the treatment, 
and the technique taught to individuals in order to directly investigate ‘selfhood’ is known as 
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vipassanā (Pāli) or insight meditation. The type of vipassanā meditation being referred to 
here is fundamentally different from the general use (or misuse) of this term in the 
psychological literature. For example, vipassanā, which actually translates as ‘superior 
seeing’, is often incorrectly referred to in the scientific (and popular Buddhist literature) as 
having the same meaning as the term mindfulness (Van Gordon et al., 2014a). 
In the manner that vipassanā meditation is taught and conceptualized in the treatment 
of ontological addiction (and in the traditional Buddhist literature), the practice involves 
capturing and refining the attentional focus cultivated during mindfulness and concentrative 
meditation practice in order to direct it in a very deliberate and specific manner (Gampopa, 
1999). Consequently, insight meditation is best practised following a prior period of 
concentrative meditation (Tsong-Kha-Pa, 2004). The reason for this is because the 
tranquilization of body and mind that occurs during concentrative meditation helps to 
introduce focus and perceptive clarity into the mind (Chah, 2011). During vipassanā 
meditation, this attentional focus is then directed in order to try to identify the causes, 
intrinsic properties, and absolute nature of a given phenomenon. More specifically, the 
technique involves attempting to locate the ‘selfness’ of the object of meditation and of the 
meditator more generally. When vipassanā meditation is practised correctly, the individual 
begins to realize that it is impossible to identify an intrinsically existing self within either 
themselves or an external object (Van Gordon, Shonin, Singh, & Griffiths, 2015d). 
Consequently, the deep-rooted core beliefs that sustain ontological addiction begin to be 
undermined. 
 
Phase Three: Reconstructing a Dynamic and Non-Dual Self 
Although Buddhism considers that the notion of an intrinsically existing self is implausible 
(Dalai Lama & Berzin, 1997), the objective during the process of treating ontological 
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addiction is not to eliminate any form of identification with a self. In other words, there is a 
difference between ‘non-self’ and ‘not caring for self’. Non-self is a tool used to undermine 
attachment to self. However, non-self is a concept used to describe an experience or state of 
realization, but it can never fully embody that state or experience. The notion of non-self is a 
construct of subject-object (i.e., self-other) conceptualization. As such, it is an expression 
(albeit at a low level of intensity) of ontological addiction, and it must ultimately be 
relinquished. When the concepts of self and non-self are abandoned, an individual can abide 
as ‘true self’. True self encompasses both the individual and the whole. A person who has 
realized true self cares for the individual because they care for the whole, and vice versa. 
Thus, it is important to clarify that the ‘deconstruction of the self’ is not related to a deep 
dissociative experience (e.g., depersonalization/derealization disorder), which would likely 
incur harmful consequences.  
For individuals to function in an adaptive manner, they must be aware that society 
considers them to be a distinct entity, and that certain roles and conforming behaviors are 
expected of them. However, the self that the individual reconstructs during Phase Three of 
the treatment is one that, having realized it is empty of intrinsic existence, is comfortable with 
assuming a self-identity for the purposes of effectively functioning in the world. In 
comparison with the self that was present at the onset of treatment, this ‘newly constructed 
self’ is a much more fluid and dynamic entity. 
As demonstrated by the experiences of an individual that received the Meditation 
Awareness Training intervention (a Buddhist-derived intervention that adheres to the phasic 
treatment model outlined here), the newly constructed ‘self’ regards itself as a deeply 
interconnected entity that is inseparable from the conditions, people, and phenomena around 
it:  
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Everything makes more sense. You start to see the bigger picture and you start to see 
just how petty people at work can be – at work it’s all about the self, the whole self, and 
nothing but the self. But when you take the self out of the equation … you kind of find 
yourself in the company’s shoes, your own shoes, and the customer’s shoes all at once 
(Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b) 
 
This increased connectivity to, and awareness of, prevailing psychological and 
environmental conditions gives rise to what in research settings has been termed the 
phenomena feedback effect (PFE) (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). PFE refers to the ability to 
reciprocally transact and communicate with the unfolding events of the present moment, and 
is reported to give rise to an increased ability to anticipate how a particular situation might 
unfold. According to Shonin and Van Gordon (2015b), PFE is the outcome of individuals 
knowing that they, and the situations in which they find themselves, are inseparable and 
continuously changing. Perceiving the self and phenomena as transient and unfixed entities is 
understood to allow individuals to work with, and stay abreast of, the present moment. 
Individuals report that the dynamic and non-dual self that is cultivated during this phase 
of treatment has greater perceptive clarity (Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). In not being 
attached to the idea that they intrinsically exist, individuals can minimize the amount of ‘I’ 
that they allocated to work and life engagements. Consequently, they are better able to ‘see 
the big picture’, and are less likely to be preoccupied with their own agenda and entitlements 
(Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015b). Furthermore, by reducing ego-centric beliefs and behaviors, 
there no longer exists a substantial ‘self’ that can be (for example) offended, let down, 
cheated, or traumatized. In other words, there is no longer a fixed locus upon which 
maladaptive cognitive-affective states can assemble, and the newly constructed and dynamic 
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‘self’ thus liberates itself from the various functional impairments associated with ontological 
addiction. 
 
Conclusions 
Despite the fact that there is increasing integration of Buddhist principles and practices into 
Western mental health and applied psychological disciplines, there appears to be limited 
understanding in Western psychology of the assumptions that underlie a Buddhist model of 
mental illness. The ontological addiction formulation is a means of addressing this problem, 
and explicates a Buddhist model of psychopathology that is sympathetic to Western 
conventions concerning the classification, etiology, and treatment of mental illness.  
An assessment of the extent to which ontological addiction meets the clinical criteria 
for addiction (utilizing Griffiths’ [2005] components model of addiction) suggests that 
ontological addiction is a valid – albeit operationally and functionally distinct (i.e., when 
compared to chemical and behavioral addictions) – form of addiction. Consistent with 2,500-
year-old Buddhist teachings, recent empirical findings suggest that addiction to the belief in 
an inherently existing self is associated with maladaptive psychosocial functioning (e.g., 
Sahdra et al., 2010). More specifically, there is rationale to suggest that ego-centric beliefs 
and behavioral-response patterns cause the mind to ‘contract’ and limit an individual’s 
psycho-spiritual development.  
In terms of etiology, ontological addiction is understood to be self-sustaining (i.e., self-
centered thoughts and behaviors reify an individual’s belief in selfhood and this, in turn, 
fosters further ego-centric responses). However, despite the chronic and pervasive nature of 
the condition, the addiction to selfhood can be overcome by a phasic treatment process that 
involves (in sequential order): (i) becoming aware of the imputed self, (ii) deconstructing the 
self, and (iii) reconstructing a dynamic and non-dual self. The first of these three phases 
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makes use of concentrative meditation techniques in order to enhance awareness of the 
various attributes of selfhood. In conjunction with the tranquility associated with 
concentrative meditation, this increased awareness of self is a prerequisite to employing 
insight meditation techniques (utilized in Phase Two of the treatment) in order to undermine 
attachment to the belief in an intrinsically existing ‘I’ entity (Van Gordon et al., 2015e). 
Phase Three of the treatment is concerned with cultivating a dynamic and non-dual self that is 
deemed (and has been empirically shown) to be better able to communicate with, and adapt 
to, the changing conditions of the present moment (Shonin, Van Gordon, Dunn, Singh, & 
Griffiths, 2014b).  
Clearly, additional theoretical and empirical endeavors are required in order to assess 
the utility of ontological addiction and its’ validly as: (i) a comprehensive model of mental 
illness and, (ii) a diagnosable form of psychopathology in and of itself. Likewise, therapeutic 
(and spiritual) discernment is clearly required in order to assess the suitability of a particular 
individual to receive, and progress through, the various (generic) treatment phases outlined in 
this paper. Nevertheless, it is the view of the present authors that the ontological addiction 
formulation constitutes an accurate portrayal of a Buddhist conceptualization of mental 
illness that is palatable to a Western clinical and scientific audience. Perhaps more 
importantly, ontological addiction appears to challenge a number of established Western 
medical and scientific assumptions concerning the determinants of mental illness and the 
notion of selfhood more generally. Consequently, further theoretical and empirical 
investigation is warranted. 
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